Hariri regards the risk of assassination philosophically; his Muslim faith clearly helps. "I believe if my life is finished, it will be finished," he says. "It is written." But the businessman in him improved the odds of survival by spending $2 million of his own money to install blast-resistant armor plating and bulletproof glass in the government palace. He employs 40 private bodyguards and drives in a convoy of six armored Mercedes with smoked-glass windows. Even the Lebanese soldiers who ride shotgun in Range Rovers interspersed with the Mercedes cars do not know which vehicle carries the Prime Minister.
... his Saudi connections have proved a source of tension in Lebanon, where foreign sponsorship of competing religious communities has often aggravated sectarian strife. Some pro-Iranian Shi'ites view the return of the Sunni Muslim billionaire with suspicion. [emphasis added - reliapundit.]
After 27 years in the kingdom, Hariri speaks with a Saudi accent. He has encouraged other wealthy Saudis to invest in Lebanese reconstruction projects. Twice last month he met with King Fahd in Saudi Arabia, where his Palestinian-born wife Nazek and five children still live when they are not in Paris. While acknowledging his friendship with the King, Hariri denies he is "Saudi Arabia's man" in Lebanon. "King Fahd doesn't need a man in Lebanon," says Hariri. "Saudi Arabia doesn't have a policy of expansion or of trying to be influential in Lebanon. He is my friend. But I'm not here on a Saudi mission."
Neither is he Syria's man, he says. Unlike his recent predecessors, Hariri claims he does not seek approval for policy decisions from Damascus, which continues to maintain 40,000 troops in his country. But since it is virtually impossible to hold high political office in postwar Lebanon without Syria's stamp of approval, Hariri has cultivated ties there. Abdel Halim Khaddam, the Syrian Vice President responsible for his country's involvement in Lebanon, is a close friend. And Hariri's firm recently completed President Hafez Assad's hilltop palace in Damascus, a gift from Saudi Arabia. In addition, Lebanese allies of Syria retain key portfolios in Hariri's Cabinet. Though a September 1992 deadline for Syrian forces to withdraw to eastern Lebanon was not observed, Hariri says the redeployment is "not an issue" because the Lebanese army isn't yet strong enough to preserve law and order on its own. He declines to set a deadline for the Syrians' departure: "We cannot sacrifice the security of the country to satisfy some people. The Syrians don't want to stay, and we don't want them to stay. But they are needed."
Nasrallah is acutely aware of the will of the majority of Lebanese and has had to tread carefully over the past two and a half years in order not to overstay his welcome. At Syria's instructions, Lebanon has allowed Hizballah free rein in the areas from which Israel withdrew in May 2000. There is no real governmental authority and no international presence in these areas, which have become "Hizballah-land."
Nevertheless, Hizballah is acutely aware that this sufferance is tenuous. If it actually crosses a certain line and provokes a massive Israeli reaction that will disrupt and destroy everything that Hariri has been trying to build in Lebanon over the last few years, Hizballah might suffer the consequences from within the Lebanese system.
The Syrians are also a factor. There is a balance of deterrence between Israel and Syria today and for the foreseeable future. The Syrians have a very large standing army that can inflict a lot of pain. They have systematically and deliberately provided Hizballah with the ability to inflict even greater pain in some ways, since it can now hit large populated areas of Israel relatively quickly, without having to deploy the Syrian military. At the same time, conventional deterrence of Syria works. Bashar Assad is under no illusions whatsoever as to what will happen to Syria in a general conflict, and this has acted to modify and restrain Hizballah on a day-to-day basis.
During the past two and a half years there have been limited breaches of the peace, such as attacks on Israeli positions at the "Shib'ah Farms." There were some artillery duels with Hizballah in the north during Israeli operations in Jenin. There has been one major Hizballah-sponsored terrorist attack across the border near Hanita that killed five civilians and one soldier. Yet this is nowhere near the full use of Hizballah capabilities. How do we keep it this way in time of crisis?
Hizballah, and the Iranians who back them, have to some extent reduced the level of direct activity across the border because they have turned much of their energy toward the manipulation of terrorist activity within the Palestinian areas and within Israel. Essentially, the Iranian establishment is more focused on supporting terrorist organizations in the Palestinian arena, with Hizballah as backers and suppliers of arms and technology. The major conduit they use is Islamic Jihad, which is directly responsive to Iranian directives. The infusion of Iranian money, support, and technology accounts for the tremendous rise in the effectiveness of Islamic Jihad operations, as compared to a couple of years ago.
Hizballah has also infiltrated the Palestinian Authority itself. The use of mortars in Gaza was begun by PA officers working under the influence and direction of Hizballah. The bombing on Tel Aviv's Neve Sha'anan Street, which took 23 lives, was also the result of a link with Hizballah.
2 comments:
The Lebanese reaction is understandable. Why blame syria?
1 - Blame on the foreigner first. It's a nationalist behaviour.
2 - Almost all political since the end of the war are targeted towards persons who were known (in the case of Elie Hobeika suspected of) working with the anti-syrian opposition.
Sunni, Druze and Christian political parties are standing together to clean lebanon from syrian "influence". It's tempting to claim that they represent all the lebanese people. But that would be leaving out the Shia muslems (maybe as much as 30% of the total population, but probably less) and the Palestinians. Hezbollah and Amal, the only "legal" armed groups in lebanon are both shia. And you dont want piss off these guys. So let's see how they handle this tricky issue.
Post a Comment